報告題目： Partial Centralization in Competing Supply Chains

报 告 人 :   施春明教授（加拿大劳瑞尔大学终身教授）

報告時間： 2019年4月25日下午3:00-4:30

報告地點：經管院B203

主辦單位：西南大學經濟治理學院

報告人簡介： 施春明，就职于加拿大劳瑞尔大学拉扎里迪斯商业与经济学院（Wilfrid Laurier University-Lazaridis School of Business and Economics），终身教授，博士生导师。本科结业于中国科技大学，并获得商业治理与电气治理双学位，今后，又先后获得了新加坡国立大学硕士学位，以及美国华盛顿州立大学运营治理博士学位。 施春明教授的研究广泛、教学兴趣多样化，其中包罗供应链治理、可连续性生长，运作治理和会计的交织研究。他的研究结果已发表在多家杂志上，如欧洲运筹学杂志，运筹学学会杂志，国际生产经济学杂志，和Omega等。 施春明教授的研究获得了加拿大国家科学、工程研究理事会以及加拿大特许会计师协会的支持，并在多年的教学实践中积累了富厚的教学经验，指导了多位博士後, 博士和硕士研究生。

報告簡介： A great amount of research has been done on whether a supply chain should be complete centralized or complete decentralized. With a completely centralized supply chain, a manufacturer can sell directly to the consumers or fully own the downstream retailer. With a completely decentralized supply chain, the manufacturer and the downstream retailer make decisions to optimize their own interests. However, complete centralization or complete decentralization may be inconsistent with the common business practice of partial centralization (PC) among firms. That is, a firm may own only a part of another firm within the same supply chain. In this paper, we make an important contribution by studying PC in two competing supply chains each with a manufacturer and a retailer. Our analyses and results show that for the competing manufacturers and their supply chains, PC can always lead to higher profits than complete centralization regardless of the level of product substitutability. Furthermore, PC can lead to higher profits for the manufacturers and their supply chains than complete decentralization except when competing are close to perfect substitutes. Therefore, this research offers an important explanation of the widespread business phenomenon of partial centralization in supply chains.